INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: DO THEY HAVE A ROLE IN THE MONITORING OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE?

Authors

  • Margaret Nowak Curtin University of Technology
  • Margaret McCabe Curtin University of Technology

Abstract

In response to perceived anger of shareholders resulting from the combination of company failures, high termination payouts and CEO remuneration packages there has been growing media interest in assigning a role to institutional investors to participate as active monitors of corporate performance. This paper explores how institutional investors undertake the monitoring of corporate performance and governance processes and structures.

Selected funds managers were interviewed about their approach to active institutional monitoring of invested companies. This article reports on the processes which funds managers indicated they adopted to monitor company performance and governance. It looks at managers' perceptions of the considerations which influenced the development of attitudes and policies about monitoring and the decision to undertake active monitoring and influencing activity. The processes and procedures through which exercise of real influence within invested companies is perceived to flow are discussed. The funds management industry is not homogeneous in its approach to active institutional monitoring and relations with invested companies. Thus, future research to measure the impact on corporate performance of the presence of institutional investors on the share register may need to differentiate between categories of institutional investor.

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Published

2006-12-30

How to Cite

Nowak, M. . ., & McCabe, M. . (2006). INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: DO THEY HAVE A ROLE IN THE MONITORING OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE?. The Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government, 12(2), 1–14. Retrieved from https://cibgp.com/au/index.php/1323-6903/article/view/13

Issue

Vol. 12 No. 2 (2006): The journal of contemporary issues in business and government

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2006 The journal of contemporary issues in business and government

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