
BILATERAL PEACE AND SECURITY: ROLE OF CHINESE ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract

The relationship between peace and economic interdependence is one of the oldest debates in the field of international relations. Liberals contend that growing economic interconnectedness will reduce the likelihood of war since neither side will be willing to pay the opportunity costs of a military confrontation. Realists like Waltz argued that while interdependence helps to promote peace in some ways, it also increases the likelihood of conflicts. Dale Copeland used viewpoints from both sides to make the case that, depending on expectations for the future trading environment, interdependence might result in peace. The subject of whether economic interdependence leads to peace needs to be re-examined in light of the current trade war. Furthermore, it makes the case that the Chinese optimistic expectations for the state of trade in the future are what led to increase in peace in the region.

INTRODUCTION

The effect of cross-border economic relationships on cooperation is an on-going topic of discussion in international relations. On the one hand, liberal theory builds on the idea that international trade serves to stabilize national politics. Diverse research, on the other hand, contends that dependence can act as leverage or friction, escalating tensions between countries. Researchers have logically attempted to use empirical evidence to settle this dispute, but the results are unclear. The prevalent researches now available are either neutral or, at most, faintly supportive of the liberal perspective, despite the fact that a sizable literature has grown to support the argument that interdependence improves interstate peace.

During the past three decades, with the collapse of USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic), the world witnessed stable peace and security in Central Asia. This is interesting because the neighbouring country Afghanistan and next door neighbour experienced huge war and terror situation in the past three to four decades. Meanwhile, the Chinese going global policy may influence to Central Asia. A natural question may arise whether economic interdependence bilateral peace in Central Asia and China are interconnected and bilateral peace is exceptional given the economic interdependence.

Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a major in economic development of the host countries. It brings technology and knowhow to the host. Through the spill over effect, FDI has positive linkages with technological spill over. Forward and backward linkages may improve knowhow in the host countries (Javorcik, 2008; Javorcik et al., 2018). Since FDI is a key player in bringing economic development in the host countries, therefore, it may also channelize peace and security in the host countries, Widespread and equitable participation in the creation of new employment, income streams, and means of subsistence is what is meant by "peace through

prosperity." Giving people the option to save and invest is necessary, along with making sure tax dollars are collected and used fairly, judiciously, and openly (Oneal, 1994).

China's trade volume with Central Asia has experienced substantial growth in recent years, reflecting the deepening economic ties between the two regions. According to the data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the total trade volume between China and the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) reached approximately \$50 billion in 2022, marking a significant increase from the previous years ((Ministry of Commerce, 2022). This surge in trade can be attributed to China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance connectivity and promote trade and investment along the ancient Silk Road routes. China's trade cooperation with Central Asia has been driven by various factors, including the region's rich natural resources and China's growing demand for energy and raw materials. Central Asia possesses abundant reserves of oil, natural gas, minerals, and metals, making it an attractive destination for Chinese investments (Erokhin et al., 2020). Additionally, the establishment of transport infrastructure projects, such as railways and pipelines, has facilitated the movement of goods and resources between China and Central Asia, further boosting bilateral trade (Sidle, 2020).

Furthermore, the development of regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum (CCACF), has played a vital role in fostering trade relations between China and Central Asia. These platforms provide avenues for dialogue, negotiation, and collaboration on trade and economic matters, promoting mutual understanding and trust among the participating countries (Hashmat, 2023). As a result, the trade volume between China and Central Asia is expected to continue its upward trajectory, solidifying the economic interdependence between the two regions.

The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between economic interdependence and peace between China and Central Asia. Despite huge scholarly work, the results are conflicting.¹ The strength and nature of the connection between global trade, FDI, and war emerge as a key research subject from the body of literature. Liberman (2004) argue that trade interdependence may reduce international conflicts and promote peace to the trading countries. Oneal & Russett (1997) contend that international trade and interdependence promote peace and reduces conflicts. Kant (2019) Immanuel Kant had suggested that economic interdependence reinforces restrictions and liberal principles by fostering transnational ties that promote conciliation rather than conflict in his dissertation on perpetual peace. On the other hand, Barbieri (1996) holds that economic interdependence promote conflict rather than peace by emphasizing the importance of taking into account the type and context of economic linkages in order to determine whether they are more likely to dampen or amplify interstate conflict, as opposed to making the assumption that trade would always foster peace.

Theoretical Underpinning

Realism, a dominant theory in international relations, offers a contrasting perspective on the relationship between economic interdependence and peace. Realists argue that economic interdependence does not necessarily lead to peace but rather can be a source of competition and conflict among states (Kunz & Morgenthau, 1948). Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer contend that states prioritize their own security and power, often viewing economic

¹ For example see the articles in Gelpi & Grieco (2003), Oneal & Russett (1997), Mansfield and Pollins (2001), Barbieri (2002), Mansfield and Pollins (2003), and Schneider, Barbieri and Gleditsch (2003)

interdependence as a means to gain advantage or leverage over others (Doyle, 1986; Joseph, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2021). While economic interests may shape state behavior, realists argue that power politics and security concerns ultimately drive international relations, making peace a product of military capabilities rather than economic ties (Mearsheimer, 2021). Therefore, realism highlights the limitations of economic interdependence in ensuring lasting peace, focusing instead on the primacy of power dynamics among states.

The two conceptual frameworks of classical liberal theory and a loosely defined collection of critics (dependency theorists, realists, and others) are most frequently used to examine interdependence. Opportunity costs related to shared economic activity are thought to deter interstate aggression in classical liberal theory (Cobden, 2011; Cohler, 1989; Milner & Cooper, 1981; Thompson & Angell, 1936). *Liberalism theory* holds that economic interdependence among countries is a significant driver of peace and cooperation in international relations. According to liberal scholars, increased economic integration fosters mutual interests and reduces the likelihood of conflicts between nations. As states become economically interdependent through trade, investment, and the exchange of resources, the costs of engaging in armed conflict or aggressive behavior outweigh the potential benefits. The concept of comparative advantage, a central tenet of liberal economics, suggests that countries can benefit from specializing in the production of goods and services in which they have a lower opportunity cost. This specialization, facilitated by economic interdependence, creates a web of interconnectedness that promotes cooperation and discourages conflict (Doyle, 1986). By pursuing their economic interests through peaceful means, states are more likely to engage in diplomatic negotiations and resolve disputes through dialogue, leading to increased stability and a reduction in the likelihood of armed conflicts (Keohane & Nye, 2017).

The theory of peace through economic interdependence, often associated with *new liberalism*, posits that increased economic integration among countries leads to a decrease in the likelihood of armed conflict (Keohane, 2005; Ruggie, 1992). Proponents argue that economic interdependence creates mutual economic interests and incentives for cooperation, making countries more reliant on peaceful resolutions to disputes. Scholars such as John Ruggie and Robert Keohane have explored the relationship between economic interdependence and peace, highlighting the potential pacifying effects of trade, investment, and shared financial interests (Keohane, 2005; Ruggie, 1992). However, critics, including Andrew Moravcsik and Benjamin J. Cohen, caution against overgeneralizing this theory, pointing out that economic interdependence can also create vulnerabilities and tensions that may escalate conflicts (Minns, 2009; Moravcsik, 1997). Thus, while the theory of peace through economic interdependence offers valuable insights; further research is needed to fully understand the complex dynamics at play.

The *constructivist theory* of peace emphasizes the role of social norms, shared beliefs, and identities in shaping international relations, including the relationship between economic interdependence and peace (Wendt, 1992). According to constructivists, economic interdependence can contribute to peace by fostering common understandings and cooperative norms among states (Finnemore, 2017). Scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Martha Finnemore have explored how ideas and social interactions influence state behavior and contribute to the construction of peaceful relations (Wendt, 1992). However, critics, including John J. Mearsheimer, question the degree to which ideas and norms can overcome material interests and power dynamics ((Mearsheimer, 2021). Therefore, while constructivism offers valuable insights into the role of ideas in shaping international relations, further research is needed to fully understand the complex interplay between economic interdependence and peace.

The concept of regionalism has been introduced as a traditional paradigm of interaction in international relations. It is also a unique model of power exercise in the international arena and is founded on ideals like collaboration, unity, and peace. Regionalism has changed after the end of the Cold War.

The theory of *regionalism* in international relations has gained significant attention in academic and policy circles due to its potential for fostering economic peace among nations. Regionalism refers to the formation of regional economic agreements and institutions that aim to promote cooperation and integration among neighbouring states. The concept of regionalism has been widely explored by scholars in the field of international relations, offering various perspectives on its effects and implications. According to Greiman (2019), regionalism can be viewed as a strategy to achieve economic peace by reducing trade barriers and promoting economic interdependence among participating states. By creating preferential trade agreements and regional economic communities, regionalism seeks to enhance economic cooperation, promote stability, and reduce the likelihood of conflict. For example, the European Union (EU) has been hailed as a successful regional integration project that has contributed to peace and stability in Europe through economic interdependence (Mansfield & Milner, 2012). Moreover, scholars such as McDonald & Rosecrance (1985) argue that economic interdependence fostered through regionalism can lead to a "zone of peace" among participating states. By deepening economic ties and creating shared economic interests, regional integration can reduce the incentives for armed conflict and provide a platform for peaceful resolution of disputes. This perspective highlights the potential of regionalism to transform the security dynamics in a region and promote peaceful coexistence among nations.

McDonald & Rosecrance (1985) provided a picture of the state as a solid, if not virtual, institution that was more dependent on its policies than its geography (Rosecrance, 1996). Adding "neo-institutional" to the term and defining "complex interdependence" as a system made up of various links, a lack of hierarchy among issues, and no war, Keohane & Nye (2017) reintroduced the liberal perspective as an alternative to realism. The focus is shifted from commerce to the globalization of production by McGuirk & Burke (2020), who contends that the dispersion of manufacturing by multinational businesses is the crucial factor. In African context, they further added that in food-producing areas, higher prices reduce conflict over the control of territory ("factor conflict") and increase conflict over the appropriation of surplus ("output conflict").

Copeland lists six variables and categorizes them into two groups: exogenous and endogenous, which determine whether expectations are positive or negative. The extent to which third-party concerns limit X's ability or incentives to engage in free commerce with Y is the first external condition. Copeland cites the instance during World War II when President Roosevelt decided against opening up trade with Japan if doing so raised the possibility of Japan invading the Soviet Union.

China's Economic Engagement in Central Asia

China's economic engagement in Central Asia has witnessed significant growth over the past decade, as it seeks to expand its influence in the region. This engagement encompasses a wide range of sectors, including infrastructure development, energy cooperation, trade, and investment (Gopalan, 2021). One key aspect of China's economic engagement is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance connectivity between China and other countries, including those in Central Asia. The BRI has provided a framework for Chinese investments in the region, promoting economic integration and facilitating trade (Buckley, 2020; Cai, 2017).

Infrastructure development is a crucial component of China's economic engagement in Central Asia. Chinese companies have been involved in the construction of roads, railways, and other transportation infrastructure projects across the region. For instance, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project, part of the BRI, will connect China's Xinjiang province with Central Asia, facilitating trade and transportation (Winter, 2021). These infrastructure projects have the potential to boost economic growth and enhance regional connectivity.

Energy cooperation is another significant area of China's economic engagement in Central Asia. China has been actively investing in the region's energy sector, particularly in oil and gas projects. Central Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, possess substantial energy resources, which are of great interest to China due to its growing energy demands. Chinese companies have entered into agreements and invested in various energy projects, including the construction of pipelines and exploration activities (Torabi & Kaveh, 2022; Vaezi & Khazaii, 2021).

Trade between China and Central Asia has experienced rapid expansion in recent years. China has become a major trading partner for several Central Asian countries, with bilateral trade volumes reaching new heights. Kazakhstan, for example, has witnessed a surge in its exports to China, primarily in the form of oil, gas, and minerals. At the same time, China's exports to Central Asia consist of a wide range of goods, including machinery, electronics, and consumer products (Erokhin et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2017). The deepening trade ties between China and Central Asia have contributed to regional economic growth.

Chinese investment in Central Asia has been substantial and diversified across various sectors. The investments encompass infrastructure, energy, manufacturing, agriculture, and telecommunications, among others. Chinese companies have established joint ventures and invested in local enterprises, bringing capital, technology, and expertise to the region (Chen et al., 2020). These investments have generated employment opportunities and contributed to economic development in Central Asia.

China's Economic Engagement in Central Asia and Bilateral Peace

China's economic engagement in Central Asia has gained significant attention due to its potential implications for regional stability and bilateral peace. This article explores the nature of China's economic activities in Central Asia and examines its impact on bilateral peace. Through an analysis of scholarly works and reports, this article provides a comprehensive overview of China's economic engagement in Central Asia and its influence on peace-building efforts.

China's economic engagement in Central Asia is characterized by massive infrastructure investments, trade partnerships, and energy cooperation. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a key driver of its economic engagement in the region (Chen et al., 2020). The BRI aims to enhance regional connectivity through infrastructure development and has attracted significant investment in Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Chinese investments in Central Asia's infrastructure have led to the development of transportation networks, including railways and highways, facilitating trade and connectivity (Kalathil, 2017). These infrastructure projects have the potential to boost economic growth in the region and promote regional integration. The improved transportation links enhance economic cooperation between China and Central Asian countries, fostering interdependence and creating conditions for peaceful relations (Rolland, 2017, 2019).

China's economic engagement in Central Asia extends beyond infrastructure projects to trade partnerships. Central Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have become crucial trading partners for China. According to a report by the World Bank, China is now the largest trading partner for most Central Asian countries, accounting for a significant portion of their total trade (Felipe & Kumar, 2012). The deepening economic ties promote mutual economic benefits and serve as a foundation for bilateral peace (Buckley, 2020).

Contrary to popular belief, China did not invest in oil in Central Asia in the late 1990s because of energy requirements or geopolitical aspirations. Energy was used as a tool to establish political ties with its neighbours, but the fundamental issue was the security of its western border. After more than 20 years of engagement, China has nonetheless emerged as one of the major geopolitical players in Central Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China will be affected by its new status in Central Asia. Energy cooperation is another important aspect of China's economic engagement in Central Asia. Central Asian countries possess substantial energy reserves, particularly natural gas and oil. China has invested heavily in energy infrastructure, including pipelines and refineries, to secure access to these resources (Xuanli Liao, 2021). This cooperation helps diversify China's energy sources and ensures a stable supply, contributing to energy security and stability in the region. The world's top economies are forging ties with Central Asian nations and making significant investments in the commerce and energy sectors. Due to its energy and security ties to this region, China is growing in stature as a global player. This will help it become less dependent on the Middle East for its energy requirements.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China and its neighbours in Central Asia have forged tight ties that have expanded to include politics and security. The region supplies China with energy, precious metals, and other natural resources. As China constructs pipelines, electricity lines, and transportation networks connecting Central Asia to its northwest region, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, investment flows in the opposite direction (Hughes, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2013). China's economic engagement in Central Asia has the potential to address economic disparities and promote social stability in the region. As a major player in the global economy, China has been investing heavily in infrastructure projects such as transportation networks and energy pipelines in Central Asia (Baltabayeva et al., 2021). These investments not only create jobs and boost economic growth but also help bridge the development gap between different countries in the region, thereby reducing economic disparities. By providing much-needed capital and technology, China's economic engagement offers an opportunity for Central Asian countries to diversify their economies, develop new industries, and improve their competitiveness in the global market.

Similarly, China's economic engagement in Central Asia has the potential to promote social stability in the region. The investments made by China contribute to the development of local communities and improve the living standards of the people (Stobdan, 1998). By providing employment opportunities and improving infrastructure, China's projects enhance the social fabric of Central Asian societies, which in turn reduces the risk of social unrest and promotes stability (Huasheng, 2013). Additionally, China's investments in education and cultural exchanges facilitate knowledge transfer and promote understanding between different cultures, fostering social cohesion and harmony. Overall, China's economic engagement in Central Asia has the potential to address economic disparities and promote social stability, making it a crucial factor in the region's development.

The economic involvement of China in Central Asia yields a multitude of advantages; however, apprehensions persist regarding its potential repercussions on the maintenance of peaceful relations

between China and the countries in the region. The economic influence exerted by China in Central Asian states is perceived as a mutually beneficial and cooperative arrangement. This influence offers these states prospects for growth, trade, and enhanced connectivity, all while upholding their sovereignty and independence (Peyrouse, 2016). Ensuring long-term bilateral peace necessitates the careful management of economic cooperation while concurrently safeguarding national autonomy.

China's economic influence in Central Asia serves as a driving force for regional stability and security by promoting dialogue and cooperation among neighbouring countries, including Russia. China and Russia exhibit shared interests and objectives in the region of Central Asia, including the joint efforts to combat terrorism, extremism, and separatism, as well as the promotion of economic integration and development (O'Neill, 2014). The effective management of geopolitical dynamics and the proactive resolution of concerns raised by neighbouring countries are imperative in order to uphold regional peace.

The relationship between economic engagement and bilateral peace is multifaceted, as economic cooperation has the potential to both promote collaboration and intensify pre-existing conflicts. For example, certain nations in Central Asia are engaged in territorial disputes, and China's investments in infrastructure initiatives within these contested areas have the potential to exacerbate tensions (Berdiyev & Can, 2020; O'Neill, 2014). The resolution of such conflicts is imperative in order to guarantee the maintenance of peaceful relations and regional stability.

China employed soft power strategies in implementing its foreign policy towards the nations situated in Central Asia. China has recently embraced the notion of soft power as a crucial instrument in its approach to international relations. The resurgence of China's soft power initiative is associated with its aspiration to enhance its regional influence. China's economic involvement in Central Asia encompasses cultural and educational interactions as well. By means of scholarships, academic partnerships, and cultural activities, China aims to strengthen interpersonal relationships and foster reciprocal comprehension (Kerimbaev et al., 2020). These initiatives have the potential to cultivate a collective sense of economic well-being and make a lasting contribution to the establishment of peaceful relations between two parties. China's national interests are in line with global interests of peace and development. China aims to establish a harmonious and prosperous environment that fosters economic growth for itself and other nations. Additionally, China seeks to diversify its energy sources and markets, while also maintaining a balance of power with other influential actors.

Scholars underscore the significance of transparency, accountability, and good governance in China's economic engagement as a means to mitigate potential risks and foster peace. According to Rolland (2017), the establishment of enhanced transparency in project financing, environmental assessments, and labour practises can effectively foster trust and mitigate potential conflicts. The establishment of well-defined protocols and mechanisms for resolving disputes is crucial in order to uphold mutual peace amidst economic interactions.

In summary, the economic involvement of China in Central Asia holds considerable ramifications for the establishment and maintenance of peace between the two parties. Infrastructure development, trade partnerships, and energy cooperation have been identified as key drivers of economic growth and facilitators of regional integration. However, it is crucial to acknowledge and confront various challenges that may hinder the achievement of long-term peace, including political dependency, geopolitical dynamics, and border disputes. Transparency, effective governance, and constructive

dialogue within multilateral frameworks have the potential to effectively address these challenges and cultivate a harmonious atmosphere that promotes shared prosperity.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a regional multilateral organization comprising eight member states, including China and several Central Asian nations. The SCO was established in 2001 to promote regional stability, economic cooperation, and security (Raeisinejad & berenji, 2022). One of the significant regional organisations that presents a new type of regionalism is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

China's involvement in the SCO has played a crucial role in fostering bilateral peace between Central Asia and China. As a major player in the region, China has pursued a foreign policy of fostering friendly relations and promoting cooperation in various areas, including trade, infrastructure, and security (Alimov, 2017; Jamali & Khan, 2021).

One of the key mechanisms for ensuring regional peace is the SCO's Regional AntiTerrorism Structure (RATS). RATS serves as a platform for member states to share intelligence and coordinate efforts to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. This collaborative approach has contributed to stability and peace in the region (Jamali & Khan, 2021; Jin & Dehang, 2019). China has access to a crucial regional and even global counterterrorism platform through the SCO. The SCO promotes long-term security collaboration and peacefully counters terrorism under the "Shanghai Spirit," stabilising China's domestic security environment while boosting the nation's economic and cultural engagement with its Central Asian neighbours (Jin & Dehang, 2019; Sadık & Yalçın İspir, 2021). By adding a layer of complexity and weighing the benefits of collaboration, a comparative examination of the SCO's counterterrorism initiatives can offer an alternative viewpoint to that of inter-block competition.

Economic cooperation is another crucial aspect of regional peace between Central Asia and China (Jin & Dehang, 2019). The SCO has facilitated trade and investment among member states, promoting economic growth and development in the region. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been instrumental in enhancing connectivity and promoting economic integration (Rab & Zhilong, 2019). The SCO's entire membership endorsed the BRI and it consistently offered China a good number of chances in the areas of trade, energy, culture, and foreign policy. The SCO's development initiatives are of great importance to China, and as a result, the organization's structure for collaboration is boosting China's relative economic success in the area (Abajyan, 2021).

China's economic engagement with Central Asia through the SCO has brought significant benefits to both sides. Central Asian countries have gained access to Chinese markets and investments, while China has secured energy resources and expanded its influence in the region. This interdependence has created incentives for peaceful cooperation (Jin & Dehang, 2019).

The SCO also serves as a platform for dialogue and negotiations among member states, which further contributes to regional peace. Regular summits and meetings provide opportunities for leaders to discuss and resolve issues through peaceful means. This diplomatic engagement fosters mutual understanding and trust. The SCO has a significant potential to maximise collaboration and reduce tensions among the member nations, according to an analysis of its institutional frameworks. The SCO, which was established under the direction of Russia and China, expanded not only the possibilities and strategies for fostering bilateral commercial and security cooperation of the aforementioned nations but also assisted in fostering regional integration among states in Central Asia

(Fan, 2021; Raesinejad & berenji, 2022). The SCO's emphasis on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs is another crucial factor in promoting regional peace. The organization's guiding principles ensure that member states' internal affairs are not meddled with, fostering stability and preventing conflicts.

The SCO's efforts to promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges have also contributed to regional peace. By facilitating interactions and promoting understanding among different cultures and societies, the organization has helped build bridges and reduce misunderstandings that could potentially lead to conflicts (Mekhdiev et al., 2019). China's growing economic influence in Central Asia has raised concerns about potential imbalances and power asymmetries. However, the SCO provides a platform for addressing these concerns through dialogue and cooperation, ensuring that economic ties between China and Central Asia are mutually beneficial and contribute to regional peace (Galiullin et al., 2020).

In conclusion, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization plays a vital role in fostering bilateral peace between Central Asia and China. Through mechanisms such as RATS, economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and cultural exchanges, the SCO promotes stability, security, and understanding among member states, contributing to regional peace and development. (M. Rajeev Kumar et al., 2021)

Limitations

China's economic engagement in Central Asia has not been without challenges. The region's geopolitical complexities, including border disputes and political instability, present risks to Chinese investments. Additionally, concerns have been raised about the sustainability and debt implications of some Chinese-funded projects. (Source 7) However, China continues to work closely with Central Asian countries to address these challenges and promote mutually beneficial cooperation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, China's economic engagement in Central Asia has been characterized by significant investments in infrastructure, energy, trade, and other sectors. China used soft power to carry out its foreign policy towards the countries of Central Asia. China recently adopted the concept of soft power as an essential tool for its foreign strategy. The BRI has played a pivotal role in facilitating China's engagement in the region. While challenges exist, the overall impact of China's economic engagement has been substantial, contributing to regional connectivity, economic growth, and enhanced trade relations between China and Central Asian countries.

The role of international organizations and multilateral platforms is crucial in promoting peaceful economic engagement. Institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provide platforms for dialogue and cooperation among Central Asian countries, China, and other stakeholders. These platforms can facilitate negotiations, enhance understanding, and contribute to regional peace.

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